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Due Process in the Administration of General
Assistance: Are Written Standards Protecting
the Indigent?
All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than
others. George Orwell, Animal Farm.*
Many needy Americans currently qualify for financial assistance through
federal-state public assistance programs-"categorical" programs-such as
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). There are, however, needy persons who fall outside the
scope of these categorical programs.' General assistance provides financial
aid to people in need who cannot qualify for categorical assistance or whose
categorical assistance is especially inadequate.2
General assistance programs, variously referred to as "home relief," "poor
relief," or "direct relief," are purely a state phen6menon. 1 Therefore, the
administration of general assistance varies widely in accordance with state
legislative directives. Twenty-three states administer general assistance through
local offices of the state public assistance agency.' In nine states, the state
public assistance agency supervises general assistance administration through
local branch offices of county or municipal governments, which usually also
serve federally aided programs.'
In stark contrast to the state-supervised administration of general assistance
is the local administration that takes place in remaining states. Currently there
are sixteen states in which no state agency exercises supervision in the ad-
ministration of general assistance.6 Until recently, many of these states allowed
* G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM ch. 10 (1946).
1. OFFICE oF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, SociAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T op HEALTH, EDUC. AND
WELFARE, CHARACTERISTICS OF GEN. ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as CHARAcTEIsTics].
2. CHAACTERISTICS, supra note 1, at 1. In 12 states general assistance is limited to persons
not eligible for AFDC or SSI. In 20 states, eligibility for general assistance extends to persons
eligible for but pending receipt of SSI or AFDC. In 6 states, recipients of AFDC or SSI may
receive general assistance, but only in emergency situations. It is assumed that the other 15 states
would give general assistance to SSI or AFDC recipients who have some special need for the
income supplementation. CHARACTERIsTICs, supra note 1, at 133 (figures include all states, and
D.C., Guam, P.R., and V.I.).
3. CHARuCTIScs, supra note 1, at 1.
4. CH AACTERISTICS, supra note 1, at 126. (Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Del., D.C., Guam.,
Hawaii, Kan., La., Mass., Mich., Mo., N.M., Okla., Or., Pa., P.R., Utah, Vt., V.I., Wash.,
W. Va).
5. CHARACTERISTICS, supra note I, at 126 (Conn., Md., Minn., Mont., N.Y., Ohio, S.C.,
Va., Wyo.).
6. CHARACTER STICS, supra note 1, at 126 (Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Ky., Miss.,
Neb., Nev., N.H., N.C., N.D., S.D., Tenn., Tex.). In addition, the states of California, Illinois,
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general assistance to be administered on a discretionary basis without writ-
ten, objective and ascertainable standards. Recent cases and consent decrees,
however, have begun to halt this practice because of due process considera-
tions. This Note addresses the issue of whether the emerging standards ade-
quately fulfill their intended purpose of providing general assistance applicants
the gamut of due process protections. The Note first presents an, overview
of the jurisdictions that administer general assistance without state supervision.7
Second, it discusses the extent to which general assistance applicants have a con-
stitutional right to written standards.' The Note then examines several due
process challenges to the standardless administration of general assistance,
as well as the resulting decisions that have required the establishment of written
standards. 9 After analyzing three sets of general assistance standards emanating
from recent litigation, this Note concludes that emerging general assistance
standards do not adequately insulate indigents from the arbitrary and pre-
judicial administration of general assistance.'"
I. THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE
Counties, cities, townships and municipalities are representative of the
various local jurisdictions which administer general assistance without state
supervision.1 ' Indiana, for example, delegates the administration of poor relief
to the trustees of its 1,008 townships.' 2 In South Dakota, the counties pro-
vide general assistance to indigents, 3 and the county commissioners are re-
quired to see that their poor "are properly relieved and taken care of. ..
One advantage of administering general assistance through local and
autonomous political jurisdictions appears to be the straightforward and sim-
ple statutory grant of powers to the locality.II Additionally, discretion is placed
in the hands of local administrators who are familiar with the community,
rather than with "strangers" at the state level. Fiscal responsibility and con-
Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin administer general assistance through local
political jurisdictions, with specifically limited responsibility exercised by the state public assistance
agency. CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 1, at 126.
7. See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 33-78 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 79-127 and accompanying text.
11. CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 1, at 126.
12. IND. CODE § 12-2-1-1 (1982).
13. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-13-1 (Supp. 1983).
14. "The county commissioners in each county shall have the oversight and care of all poor
persons in the county so long as they remain a county charge, and shall see that those persons
are properly relieved and taken care of in the manner provided by law .... S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 28-13-16 (Supp. 1983).
15. The Indiana statute is straightforward and simple: "The overseer of the poor in each
township shall have the oversight and care of all poor persons in his township so long as they
remain in a charge, and shall see that they are properly relieved and taken care of in the manner
required by law." IND. CODE § 12-2-1-6 (1982). For the text of South Dakota's similar statute,
see supra note 14. For the text of New Hampshire's statute, see infra note 110.
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trol are sometimes touted as advantages because the financing of unsuper-
vised general assistance programs is usually provided by the individual coun-
ty or township (or similar jurisdiction) administering the program.' 6
Criticism, however, has been leveled at the integrity and efficacy of local
and unsupervised general assistance programs:
For better or for worse, we have passed out of the era which produced
the township assistance system. Problems which were once laid on the
shoulders of individuals are now society's responsibilities. Questions which
were once answered by human intuition are now responded to in tapestries
of numbers and symbols. Furthermore, these trends toward standardiza-
tion and objectification have had their influence on our laws, especially
at the constitutional level."
The question of which jurisdictional body will govern the administration
of a state's general assistance program is of course a legislative one. State
legislatures, however, should take cognizance of open-ended statutes that leave
unsupervised local administrators of general assistance the potential to neglect
carelessly or invidiously the needs of the poor.
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE
The Constitution's fourteenth amendment prohibits deprivation of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." The concept of "due pro-
cess" has come to encompass both substantive and procedural aspects. The
substantive due process doctrine is premised on the notion that certain types
of lawmaking go beyond any proper sphere of governmental activity.' 9 If a
particular piece of legislation inhibits a guarantee protected by the Bill of
Rights, or a "fundamental right" as designated by the Supreme Court, strict
scrutiny of the law is triggered.2" Procedural due process, on the other hand,
concerns the decision-making process followed before the government takes
some action directly impairing a person's life, liberty, or property.2' Unlike
the substantive due process analysis, the concern here is not with the legisla-
tion itself, but rather with the process of administration.
Any given situation may implicate both procedural and substantive due pro-
cess guarantees, and it is often difficult to distinguish between the two. A
general assistance applicant's claimed right to standards implicates both
substantive and procedural due process concerns. On the one hand, the lack
16. See generally CHRgcTERisncs, supra note 1.
17. Rosenberg, Overseeing the Poor: A Legal-Administrative Analysis of the Indiana Township
Assistance System, 6 IND. L. REv. 385, 386 (1973).
18. "IN]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law ..... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
19. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNsTrr-moNAL LAW 418 (1983) [hereinafter referred
to as NowA<, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
20. Id.
21. Id. at 417.
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of written standards may render legislation authorizing general assistance
violative of substantive due process because the legislation is subject to ar-
bitrary and capricious administration. The possibility of arbitrary and
capricious administration, however, strikes at the heart of procedural due pro-
cess guarantees. This inevitable effect of the legislation, rather than the legisla-
tion itself, is the real evil which creates an essentially procedural due process
problem.
Courts have not agreed as to whether the standardless administration of
general assistance involves a substantive or a procedural due process problem.22
It is clear, however, that in order to invoke procedural due process protec-
tion, one must first establish a "property" or "liberty" interest subject to
governmental deprivation.23 Although the Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the issue of whether general assistance applicants have a legitimate
property or liberty interest sufficient to trigger fourteenth amendment
guarantees, in Goldberg v. Kelly2" the Court found that a recipient of welfare
benefits has a statutory entitlement to continuation of benefits constituting
a protectible property interest.25 Two years later, in Board of Regents v. Roth,26
the Court delimited Goldberg's expansive concept of property interests, stating:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it . ..
Property interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-
rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims
of entitlement to those benefits."
Without ignoring the dictates of Roth, the Supreme Court subsequently held
in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates2" that an applicant may, in some
circumstances, have a protectible property interest in a benefit not yet received.
In Greenholtz, prisoners of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex
brought a class action claiming they had been unconstitutionally denied parole.
The Court addressed, in part, whether the Nebraska parole release statute
creates in inmates a protectible expectation of parole. The Court held that
although a provision for the mere possibility of parole does not create an
22. Compare White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976) (issue is whether plain-
tiffs' procedural due process rights were violated by the method by which they were denied general
assistance) with Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (D.N.H. 1976) (administra-
tion of general assistance pursuant to written standards is essentially a question of substantive
due process).
23. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
24. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
26. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
27. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
28. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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entitlement to it, the "unique structure" of the Nebraska parole statute29 did
provide a protectible, albeit limited, entitlement.3" The "unique structure"
of the statute which the Court found dispositive apparently relates to the pro-
vision mandating release when none of the statute's four exceptions ap-
plies. In Griffeth v. Detrich'3 1 the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Greenholtz
in holding that general assistance applicants do have a legitimate property
interest in benefits. The appellate court emphasized that the state statute
authorizing general assistance placed a "mandatory duty" on counties to supply
general assistance to eligible applicants, and that the state-promulgated regula-
tions governing general assistance were sufficiently comprehensive and definite
to establish clear eligibility criteria.32
Greenholtz and Griffeth suggest that where objective criteria set forth by
state law sufficiently allow an applicant to make a prima facie showing of
eligibility, and where state law places a mandatory duty on the administrator
to provide assistance to eligible applicants, the applicant has a protectible prop-
erty interest in the expected benefits.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE STANDARDLESS ADMINISTRATION OF
GENERAL ASSISTANCE
The administration of general assistance without written, ascertainable stand-
ards has been challenged in various states. An overview of recent litigation
demonstrates a judicial trend toward requiring written standards in an at-
tempt to guarantee applicants the due process rights of the fourteenth
amendment.
The question of whether due process considerations required the town select-
men in New Hampshire to administer general assistance pursuant to public,
written standards was addressed in Baker-Chaput v. Cammett.3 3 The federal
district court held that the establishment of written, objective and ascertainable
standards for general assistance was an elementary and intrinsic part of due
process:
29. The Nebraska statute stated:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who
is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion
that his release should be deferred because:
(a)There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;(b)His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect
for law;
(c)His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline;
or
(d)His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other
training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding
life when released at a later date.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
30. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.
31. 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 970 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. Griffeth, 603 F.2d at 121.
33. 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976).
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The applicant must be afforded the opportunity to know beforehand what
substantive criteria she had to meet in orderto obtain general assistance.
Without the issuance of standards, the initial reasons for denial may change
and be replaced with new and differing reasons which the applicant is
unable to contest.
3 4
In Baker-Chaput, the thirty-one year old plaintiff was single and five months
pregnant. 3 Her twenty dollars per week income was insufficient to meet her
minimum needs; her landlord had threatened eviction, and her utility com-
pany had threatened a shut-off. 36 She applied to the town selectmen for general
assistance and was denied. 37
To determine whether the plaintiff had a right to demand written standards,
the Baker-Chaput court embarked upon a two-step analysis. First, it asked
whether the private interest at stake was a property interest or a liberty in-
terest protected by the fourteenth amendment. 38 The court found that the
plaintiff's interest was a property interest, since, under the statute, she had
made a prima facie showing of eligibility. 39 The second step of the court's
analysis weighed the plaintiff's interest in being informed of the standards
against the government's interest in not promulgating standards.4" The court
found that the plaintiff's interests outweighed the state's interests, stating:
The absence of standards creates a void in which malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance or prejudice can fester. Plaintiff has a paramount interest in
receiving those benefits for which she statutorily qualifies. In addition,
as a member of our society, she has an interest not only in being treated
fairly by the administrative agency, but, just as important, in believing
that she has been treated fairly. A standardless method of administration
negates these interests."
In White v. Roughton,"2 the Seventh Circuit reached a decision similar to
that in Baker-Chaput. In White, the court held that the defendant, the ad-
ministrator of the general assistance program in Champaign Township, Il-
linois, was responsible for administering the program to ensure the "fair and
34. Id. at 1140 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 1136.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1137. To qualify as a fourteenth amendment property or liberty interest, it must
be shown that the deprived individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement which is rooted in
a legal obligation. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
39. Baker-Chaput, 406 F. Supp. at 1135 ("Plaintiff, like the Goldberg plaintiffs [see infra
note 40] bases her claim on a state statute under which she has made a primafacie showing
of eligibility ... it follows that she has a 'property' interest in general assistance benefits and
that due process considerations attached upon her application for public welfare.").
40. Id. at 1137-38. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipient is entitled
to notice and an evidentiary hearing before termination of benefits); Brooks v. Center Township,
485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 911 (1974) (termination of Indiana poor
relief benefits without notice, a pretermination hearing, and an opportunity to be heard held
unconstitutional).
41. Baker-Chaput, 406 F. Supp. at 1140.
42. 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).
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consistent" application of eligibility requirements,' 3 which required the defend-
ant to establish written standards and regulations." The court based its
holding on the due process clause, stating, "[d]ue process requires that welfare
assistance be administered to ensure fairness and freedom from arbitrary
decision-making as to eligibility. Federally subsidized public assistance is
governed by statute and extensive regulations."" 5
In Indiana, general assistance is administered through the state's 1,008
townships. 6 The township trustee, an elected official, is the supreme ad-
ministrator of the assistance program, and thus is not within the jurisdiction
of the State Department of Public Welfare."7 If an applicant for poor relief
is not satisfied with the decision of the township trustee, the applicant may
appeal the initial denial to the board of county commissioners." The decision
of the board of commissioners is final, unless the applicant seeks relief through
the court system.
Nothing in Indiana's statute specifically requires the township trustee to
establish standards for the administration of relief.' 9 This omission, however,
was remedied by the consent decree of a federal district court in Hopson v.
Schilling." The indigent plaintiff in Hopson alleged that Indiana poor relief
laws were unconstitutional because they failed to require the township trustees
to administer relief pursuant to public, written standards.' In a consent
decree,52 the court ordered that the failure of the trustees to administer poor
relief in accordance with public, written standards violated the fourteenth
amendment due process rights of all poor relief applicants and recipients in
Indiana." The minimum standards mandated by the Hopson decree required
43. Id. at 753-54.
44. Id. at 754. At a hearing in the district court on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary in-
junction, the defendant admitted that he and his staff determined eligibility based upon their
own unwritten personal standards. Id.
45. Id. at 753 (citations omitted).
46. IND. CODE § 12-2-1-1 (1982).
47. Id. § 12-1-20-1 ("No township trustee of the state of Indiana shall be under the jurisdic-
tion of the State Department of Public Welfare.
48. Id. § 12-2-1-18.
49. The language is ambiguous as to whether the trustee must promulgate standards:
In hearing an appeal the Board and its hearing officers shall be guided by uniform
relief standards of eligibility and need established by or for the township trustee
as overseer of the poor for the granting of poor relief in his township. If no such
standards have been established, the board and its hearing officers shall be guided
by the circumstances in each case.
Id. (emphasis added). In Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1232 n.10 (N.D. Ind. 1976),
this precise statutory language is discussed:
Especially under section 12-2-1-18, it is apparent that as between the county com-
missioners and the township trustee, the trustee is expected to exercise his delegated
powers by promulgating standards. But while the statute, fairly read, anticipates
certain conduct by the trustee, the statutes do not expressly place in the applicant
a right to command the performance of these duties.
50. 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (granting certification of plaintiff class).
51. Id. at 1227.
52. Hopson v. Schilling, No. L-75-30 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 1978) (unpublished consent decree).
53. Hopson v. Schilling, No. L-75-30, slip op. at 4.
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guidelines detailing financial eligibility for poor relief, including the maximum
allowable income, a statement of all non-financial conditions of eligibility,
a statement of the needs which will normally be met if an applicant is eligi-
ble, and a description of the procedures the applicant must follow to obtain
relief."' Additionally, the order required that trustees provide applicants with
written notice of the decision reached on their application, including the reasons
for that determination, and written notice of their right to appeal an adverse
decision."
In State ex rel. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township,16 the Indiana Court of
Appeals examined the substantive and procedural nature of standards estab-
lished and enforced pursuant to the Hopson order. In Van Buskirk, the plain-
tiffs asserted that certain general assistance standards, comprised in part of
broad, general statements,5" reserved unlimited discretion to the trustee and
thus rendered impotent the very due process protections the standards were
meant to provide. 58 The court agreed with the plaintiffs, stating that the stand-
ards in question "indeed seem to vest standardless discretion in the Trustee." 59
To resolve this problem, the court required the trustee's standards to be
reasonably complete and to include a description of the "needs that will nor-
mally be met" if an applicant is eligible for assistance.6" Whether these are
adequate safeguards to prevent unlimited discretion, however, remains open
to question.6 '
In a more substantive vein, the plaintiffs in Van Buskirk argued that the
trustee's financial eligibility guidelines were so unreasonably low as to preclude
indigents from qualifying for relief even though they were not capable of pro-
viding themselves with basic necessities. 62 The appellate court remanded this
issue, stating that "a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether
the standards are reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the poor." '63 The
court noted that the standards were not formulated with reference to any na-
tional, state, or local poverty income guidelines, and that the methodology
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3-4.
56. - Ind. App. -, 418 N.E.2d 234 (1981).
57. An example of one such statement is: "The amount and length of assistance, when added
to all other income and resources, shall be as determined by the Trustee." Id. at -, 418
N.E.2d at 245.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The language requiring the trustee to list the "needs that will normally be met" is
identical to the language in the Hopson order and consent decree. See supra text accompanying
note 54.
61. Arguably, the Van Buskirk decision has not been effective in eliminating broad and poten-
tially dangerous statements from the standards. A 1983 examination of North Township stan-
dards reveals that the broad language, see supra note 57, is retained. See North Township Elibil-
ity Standards, infra note 83, at IX (last paragraph).
62. Van Buskirk, - Ind. App. at - , 418 N.E.2d at 244.
63. Id. at -, 418 N.E.2d at 245.
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used to establish the standards (if in fact any methodology was used) war-
ranted an examination into its adequacy.
6 4
Perhaps the clearest substantive issue resolved in Van Buskirk was the in-
validation of the trustee's policy that only renters were eligible for shelter
assistance.65 The court determined that the flat refusal of the trustee to evaluate
an applicant's need for shelter assistance solely because the applicant was buy-
ing his or her home was an abuse of discretion.66
Like Indiana, South Dakota has only recently begun administering general
assistance pursuant to written standards. Prior to negotiations sparked by Moe
v. Brookings County,67 only one county had promulgated standards for the
administration of general assistance.68 Although the matter of Moe v. Brook-
ings County was settled before adjudication,69 the facts of the case illustrate
abuses suffered by indigents when general assistance is administered without
written standards.
On May 15, 1980, Mrs. Moe sent a letter to the Brookings County Board
of Commissioners requesting financial assistance, and received no response."'
Thereafter, an attorney for the East River Legal Services Corporation sent
second and third letters which also elicited no response. 7' On August 28, 1980,
Mr. Moe requested that he be able to appear before the Commissioners. The
appearance was granted September 4, 1980, almost four months after the in-
itial letter .72 Standing before the Commissioners, Mr. Moe outlined his finan-
cial condition, was admonished for what the Board regarded as his wife's
mismanagement of the food budget, and was warned he would receive no
relief if the Board learned that he had been in any of the town's bars.73 At
this meeting, the Moes were granted $100 in assistance, which was paid directly
to their landlord. 74 One month later, Mr. Moe again appeared before the Board
of Commissioners, which agreed to pay the Moe's landlord another $100 for
one month's rent. At that meeting, Mr. Moe was advised that this was the
last time he could expect assistance. 71 When Mr. Moe again spoke with the
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. In Hopson, Judge Eschbach abstained from ruling on the constitutionality of the
interpretation of the Indiana statute premising eligibility for poor relief on whether an applicant
had rent or mortgage obligations. Hopson, 418 F. Supp. at 1240-41. At the time of Hopson,
ambiguities in the statute, IND. CODE § 12-2-1-10(b) (1982), had not been clarified by a state
court. Van Buskirk, however, laid that issue to rest. See supra text accompanying note 65.
67. 659 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1981).
68. That county is Minnehaha. Wagner, General Assistance in South Dakota: A Need for
Written, Objective, and Ascertainable Standards, 27 S.D.L. Rav. 201, 209 (1982) [hereinafter
referred to as Wagner].
69. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
70. Moe, 659 F.2d at 882.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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County Auditor's Office on November 7, 1980, he was told that no relief
request could be tendered until the November 20 meeting of the Board.76
Soon afterwards, the Moes brought an action alleging that Brookings County
violated fourteenth amendment guarantees by not administering county poor
relief pursuant to public, written, ascertainable standards." Eventually, the
parties came to an agreement whereby Brookings County would adopt a
County Poor Relief Ordinance, which provided written guidelines for the
administration of general assistance."
Despite a state interest in the discretionary administration of general
assistance, the above cases suggest that the due process clause requires general
assistance to be dispensed pursuant to written, objective and ascertainable
standards. As the final section of this Note argues, however, the mere ex-
istence and application of written standards is not enough to ensure that due
process rights are being protected. Recently promulgated general assistance
standards have ambiguities which administrators can manipulate to make in-
vidious or arbitrary decisions.
IV. THE CONTINUUM OF STANDARDS: WHAT IS Too FLEXIBLE AND
WHAT IS Too RIGID?
The purpose of most general assistance programs is to meet the financial
needs of indigent persons who do not qualify for aid under a federal-state
public assistance program, or whose federal-state assistance is inadequate."
Consequently, standards used to administer general assistance should not
replicate the regulations used to administer federal-state assistance programs,
because if significant overlap occurs, the persons falling "between the cracks"
of federally aided programs might likewise find themselves ineligible for general
assistance. Arguably then, the promulgation of reasonably flexible standards
is an important goal in the administration of general assistance. Yet excessive
malleability can lead to abuses which indigents, unrepresented by counsel,
are not likely to challenge. While government agencies are far from perfect,
"there is a human tendency ... to assume that an action taken by a govern-
mental agency in a pecuniary transaction is correct.""0 Consequently, stand-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 881.
78. Seven days after this action began, the federal district court abstained sua sponte, citing
a need to "avoid needless conflict with administration by the State of South Dakota of its own
affairs." Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's abstention order and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Id. at 884. The case was later settled out of court. Moe v. Brook-
ings County, No. 80-4188 (D.S.D. Sept. 7, 1982) (Adoption of Stipulation for Judgment by
Joint Agreement). For a partial reproduction of the ordinance that was adopted, see infra note 98.
The attorney for the Moes has written an article detailing the case and advocates the pro-
mulgation of written, ascertainable standards and outlines factors which should be considered
in the formulation of general assistance standards. See generally Wagner, supra note 68.
79. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
80. Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1008 (1975).
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ards emerging pursuant to recent litigation must be examined with human
tendencies and with due process considerations in mind.
The standards mandated by Hopson v. Schilling are the most malleable-
and the most manipulatable-on the continuum of standards emerging from
recent litigation., It should be noted that the actual language of Indiana's stan-
dards varies among townships because no state agency, including the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, has jurisdiction over the administration of poor relief
in Indiana." The township is autonomous. However, the Hopson order s2 re-
quired the drafting of model guidelines which have come to form the basis
for most general assistance standards in Indiana. 3
81. IND. CODE § 12-1-20-1 (1982).
82. Hopson v. Schilling, No. L-75-30 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 1978) (unpublished consent decree).
See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
83. Excerpted below is a typical version of general assistance standards in Indiana, although
the standards have been edited in the interest of brevity:
11. Application for poor relief assistance is started by filling out and signing an
application and swearing to the accuracy of the facts on that application. You will
be required to cooperate with an investigation of your personal finances, family
responsibilities, and your eligibility to receive other types of assistance. This in-
vestigation may include a home visit ....
IV. (a) Your application will be reviewed immediately. Investigation and verifica-
tion will be done as soon as possible by the trustee. A decision will be made only
upon the completion of all investigation and verification. You will be given written
notice of the decision and if any aid is denied, the reasons will be on a form called
a P.R.-IA. That form will inform you that you have a right to appeal any denial
of aid and will explain how to start your appeal ....
VI. Applicants who have not received the total current or projected gross monthly
household income listed in the standards below in the previous month, and who
are otherwise eligible, will be considered eligible for poor relief. Special emergen-
cies, extraordinary expenses, or other unusual conditions may be considered in lieu
of standard investigation procedures, requirements and the following minimum
standards:
Persons in Household Total Monthly Income
1 $235.00
2 297.00
3 357.00
4 413.00
5 466.00
6 510.00
7 564.00
8 601.00
9 653.00
10 704.00
each additional person add 55.00
VII. Monthly income is defined as that total current and projected gross income
which is available to the household from any source, including, but not limited
to, non-monetary income, support payments, Social Security checks, Veterans Ad-
ministration benefits, Welfare checks, Unemployment Compensation and sick
benefits.
VIII. Resources available to you beyond those necessary for basic living needs and
to earn a livelihood, will be considered as assets and may affect your eligibility.
Except where it is reasonable to borrow money on the equity, resources that are
exempt from this test will include a house where the household resides and a motor
vehicle.
IX. If the trustee determines an eligible applicant has any of the following im-
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Generally, an Indiana township's poor relief standards address the max-
imum income allowed in determining an applicant's eligibility for assistance.
In the interests of malleability, these standards provide that special emergen-
cies or extraordinary expenses may be considered in lieu of the maximum
income requirements. 4 This provision works to the advantage of an appli-
cant who is slightly over-income but suffering hardship due to an extraor-
dinary expense.
Indiana's "flexible" standards, however, have many flaws. For instance,
North Township's (Lake County, Indiana) standards state that investigation
of an applicant's personal finances will be conducted "as soon as possible," 8
and that a decision on the applicant's eligibility will be made only upon the
completion of the trustee's investigation. A trustee's investigation can
sometimes span a period of three or more weeks. This type of delay may
cause severe hardship, as when an applicant is threatened with a utility shut-
off or eviction. A lengthy investigation period violates the spirit of the poor
relief statute,86 and further, trustees who abuse the flexibility of the investiga-
tion period by drawing it out weeks or longer subvert and discourage
meritorious claim-bringing by eligible indigents.
This problem could be averted by requiring the trustee to complete his or
her investigation within a specified time period-perhaps three working days
from the date of application.87 Such procedural requirements would serve to
protect an applicant's due process rights while sacrificing little of the trustee's
substantive decisional flexibility.
mediate needs, the trustee has the authority and will provide in the most economical
and practical manner:
(a) Food.
(b) Shelter. The trustee shall provide aid in whatever form is necessary to provide
shelter or prevent the loss of shelter so long as such aid constitutes the most
economical and practical method of relieving the applicant.
(c) Utility service and heating fuels.
(d) Clothing.
(e) Necessary household supplies (such as simple first aid and equipment, minimal
household furnishings, utensils and appliances).
(f) Medical services, including doctor's fees, surgeon's fees, medical supplies,
prescriptions, special dietary needs, nursing care and hospitalization unless available
through a governmental program.
(g) School books and supplies.
(h) Burial expenses.
(i) Transportation assistance to obtain employment when there is a reasonable
likelihood of being hired.
The Township Trustee may provide benefits beyond those enumerated above. The
amount and length of assistance, when added to all other income and resources,
shall be sufficient to meet the needs as determined by the trustee.
North Township Trustee, Lake County, Indiana, Poor Relief Eligibility Standards and Procedures
(revised Aug. 1981) [hereinafter referred to as North Township Eligibility Standards].
84. See supra note 83, at VI.
85. See supra note 83, at IV(a).
86. "A trustee shall accept and promptly act upon an application from any person requesting
assistance. IND. CODE § 12-2-1-6.2(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
87. Indeed, some standards in Indiana do have provisions which require the investigation
to be completed in three working days. It is not known, however, whether that policy is regularly
followed.
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Another problem on the face of North Township's standards appears in
the provision concerning an applicant's assets. The standards state that "assets
• ..may affect . ..eligibility." ' 88 There is no indication, however, of the
types of assets that will render an applicant ineligible, other than "[r]esources
available .. .beyond those necessary for basic living needs and to earn a
livelihood ... ,'9 The vagueness of this section leaves the trustee with "stand-
ardless" discretion in terms of assessing an applicant's assets. Whereas one
trustee might consider an insurance policy with a loan value as an asset that
renders the applicant ineligible, another trustee might not. The cumulative
effect of such ambiguities may well abridge the applicant's due process right
to the fair and consistent application of eligibility requirements."
Finally, most standards in Indiana grant the trustee unfettered discretion
in determining the "needs" of an applicant. For instance, the North Township
standards provide '[tihe amount and length of assistance . . . shall be suffi-
cient to meet the needs as determined by the trustee" 9' An applicant whose
income level renders him or her "eligible" for assistance may nonetheless be
denied assistance because the trustee determines the applicant to have no
"needs." Such standards, directed only to income eligibility and not "needs,"
ultimately deny the applicant the opportunity to know beforehand what
substantive criteria must be met in order to obtain general assistance.92 In
State ex rel. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township," the plaintiffs challenged the
"amount and length of assistance" provision, claiming such language vested
the trustee with "standardless" discretion. 94 In dicta, the Van Buskirk court
addressed the problem. The meaning of the language in question, the court
said, "is very unclear. It does indeed seem to vest standardless discretion in
the Trustee. The problems with such standardless administration of poor relief
have been recognized."" Despite the fact that the Van Buskirk court frowned
upon the ambiguous language, it did not require the sentence to be stricken
from the trustee's standards. As a result, most general assistance standards
in Indiana retain similar or identical language. 9 6
In settling Moe v. Brookings County,97 Brookings County, South Dakota
also adopted a County Poor Relief Ordinance which contained detailed, writ-
ten standards for the administration of general assistance.'" One unusual aspect
of the Brookings County standards is that it commands the auditor to pro-
88. See North Township Eligibility Standards, supra note 83, part VIII.
89. See id., supra note 83, at VIII.
90. Accord Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (D.N.H. 1976).
91. See North Township Eligibility Standards, supra note 83, at IX (last paragraph).
92. Accord Baker-Chaput, 406 F. Supp. at 1140.
93. - Ind. App. - , 418 N.E.2d 234 (1981).
94. See North Township Eligibility Standards, supra note 83, at IX (last paragraph).
95. - Ind. App. at __, 418 N.E.2d 234, 245.
96. See North Township Eligibility Standards, supra note 83, at IX (last paragraph).
97. 659 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1981).
98. The Brookings County Ordinance contains, inter alia, the following provisions:
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vide the general assistance applicant with a written summary of eligibility
ARTICLE V
Application Process, Notice and Applicant Responsibilities
Any person has the right to apply for County Poor Relief assistance .... After
the person has completed and signed the Application for County Assistance form,
the Application shall then be submitted to the Auditor.
Once the Application has been made, the Auditor shall promptly inform the
Applicant of:
(a) A summary of the eligibility requirements, which summary shall be given
in writing to the Applicant:
(b) The Applicant's right to review if denied assistance, and the manner in which
such a review may be obtained;
(c) The Applicant's responsibility for reporting all the facts necessary to deter-
mine eligibility;
(d) The necessity and types of verification needed;
(e) The fact that an investigation may be conducted in an effort to substantiate
the facts and statements as presented by the Applicant and that this investigation
may take place prior to, during, or subsequent to the Applicant's receipt of county
assistance;
ARTICLE VI
Hearings
Insofar as possible the Board [of County Commissioners] shall review and con-
sider an application at its next regularly scheduled meeting after such Application
has been submitted to the Auditor .... If the Application is not for an "emergen-
cy need," the Board may continue the review and consideration of any Application
from time to time in order to obtain verifying information, to acquire further in-
formation about an Applicant's eligibility or needs, or to apply for other sources
of assistance to which the applicant would appear to be entitled. However, no deter-
mination and decision on an Application shall be continued beyond fourteen (14)
days from the time of its initial consideration by the Board without the Applicant's
consent ....
At the time that an Applicant submits a signed Application to the Auditor, the
Applicant shall be entitled to request on the Application a decision within three
(3) business days. In the event the Board does not meet as a body during such
three (3) business days, then the Auditor shall submit the Application to one or
more county commissioners who shall be entitled to render a decision on the Ap-
plicant's eligibility and need. If the commissioner or commissioners do not make
a determination, the Applicant shall be entitled to a hearing before the Board as
a whole at its next regularly scheduled meeting. If the commissioner or commis-
sioners render a decision within such three (3) day period which denies the Applica-
tion in whole or in part, the Applicant shall be notified that the Applicant shall
be entitled to appeal such denial to the Board as a whole at its next regularly scheduled
meeting. If an Applicant's need appears to be an "emergency need," the commis-
sioner or commissioners may treat the application as a request for Emergency Relief
under Article VII of this Ordinance.
ARTICLE VII
Emergency Relief
In case of an emergency need as hereafter defined any one commissioner shall
be empowered to authorize assistance of up to $100.00 to any person who to such
commissioner, appears to be otherwise eligible for poor relief. Such commissioner
may waive the requirement that such recipient fill out an Application prior to receiving
such assistance, provided, however, that any such recipient must complete and sign
an Application within five (5) business days of receiving such assistance . . ..
An "emergency need" . . . is a need going to the health or well-being of an
individual and of such an immediate nature that the time ordinarily needed to follow
standard procedures for poor relief would endanger or cause undue hardship to
such person.
[Vol. 59:443
GENERAL ASSISTANCE STANDARDS
requirements.99 This personal service of eligibility requirements is a preferable
form of notice compared to the mere posting of standards, as is done by
Indiana township trustees.
A more problematic part of the Brookings County standards states that
an application may be reviewed and considered for up to two weeks after
the time of its initial consideration by the board.'00 Given the nature of the
needs of a poor relief applicant (requests often include items such as food
and heat), the maximum two week period allowed for review of an applica-
tion seems unduly long.' 0 ' Furthermore, the standards indicate that if the ap-
plicant consents, the board can continue consideration of the application for
an even longer-in fact indefinite-period of time. Disparity of bargaining
power exists here; a timid but needy applicant might be hesitant to demand
speedy action on his or her application and risk raising the ire of the board.
The Brookings County Ordinance does provide the applicant the right to
ARTICLE VIII
Eligibility
A.... 2) "Poor and Indigent." In meriting entitlement, each applicant must
demonstrate the current status of being "poor and indigent" ..... This determina-
tion shall be made by examining, among other things, the Applicant's total economic
resources (to include current assets and income) and total economic needs. Wherever
appropriate (e.g. where there exists a legal duty of support among family members),
that determination shall also include a review of family size, total family economic
resources and total family economic needs. As a general policy, the Board in deter-
mining eligibility will apply the indigency standards set forth more completely in
Appendix A, attached hereto; however, for good cause shown the Board shall have
the right to make exceptions ...
APPENDIX A:
Indigency Standard for Brookings County
In order to qualify for assistance from the County, each applicant must satisfy
both the following criteria simultaneously ...
1) INDIVIDUAL RESOURCES:
No Applicant for County Assistance shall own property in excess of $5,000 fair
market value; provided however, the Applicant may own a personal homestead
... which shall be exempt up to the Applicant's equity interest in the maximum
amount of $30,000 ...
["Emergency Case Hospitalization":]
By declared policy, the County shall evaluate and accept its responsibilities...
by considering the totality of circumstances surrounding each Application. With
respect to claimed medical indigency, the Board shall consider as one circumstance,
the protection which is otherwise available to its residents from the medical in-
surance industry. The County is not in the insurance business and does not con-
sider itself to be the "major-medical" insurer of all County residents. Accordingly,
the Board shall consider, in addition to all other circumstances, whether or not
the Applicant, now claiming medical indigency might otherwise have purchased
individual "major medical" insurance coverage, the Board shall award benefits
in such light.
Brookings County, S.D., Ordinance Establishing Poor Relief Guidelines and Providing for Ad-
ministration of Poor Reljef in Brookings County (1981) (pursuant to S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN.
§ 28-13-16 (Supp. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as Brookings County Poor Relief Guidelines].
99. See Brookings County Poor Relief Guidelines, supra note 98, at Art. V(a).
100. See id. at VI.
101. Manchester, New Hampshire, standards are much more conducive to timely decisions.
See infra note 110, at IV(A)l(b).
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request a decision within three business days of the application.' 2 On close
examination, however, this provision appears to be toothless. If the board
does not meet as a body during those three days, a county commissioner may
render a decision on the application if he or she is so inclined. But no one
is required to render a decision in three days, even though the applicant may
have a very good reason for requesting a speedy decision.
If the applicant is facing an emergency-"a need going to the health or
well-being of an individual'"-any one commissioner is empowered to grant
up to $100 and waive preliminary application requirements. 0 3 While this ac-
commodation provides flexibility where it is needed most, the $100 ceiling
may be too low to meet many types of emergencies, such as a utility shut-off
in January.
The eligibility requirements of the ordinance are generally praiseworthy.
They state that as a general policy, the board will apply certain indigency
standards, but will make exceptions for good cause.' 04 Because one purpose
of general assistance is to serve the needy who fall "between the cracks" of
categorical assistance programs,' 5 this amenable policy may well assist the
needy who cannot qualify for federally assisted programs, but who never-
theless need financial assistance.
Finally, the Brookings County standards indicate that the commissioners
can refuse to award assistance for medical costs if the applicant "might other-
wise" have purchased major medical insurance coverage.' 6 This "hindsight"
determination by the commissioners contradicts the guarantees of the due pro-
cess clause. It appears unfair to allow the commissioners to determine an ap-
plicant's eligibility for assistance based upon what they think the applicant
"should have done" months or years ago. First, it would be extraordinarily
difficult to appeal successfully a hindsight decision by the commissioners; sec-
ond, a hindsight determination is by its nature tenuous, if not arbitrary.
General assistance applicants have a procedural due process right to be free
from arbitrary decisionmaking."°"
Pursuant to the mandate of Baker-Chaput v. Cammett,'0 ' Manchester, New
Hampshire has also established written guidelines for the administration of
general assistance.' 9 These guidelines generally fall at the less discretionary
end of the continuum."0 The guidelines are specific in regard to the timeliness of
102. See Brookings County Poor Relief Guidelines, supra note 98, at Art. VI.
103. See id. at Art. VII.
104. See id.
105. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
106. See Brookings County Poor Relief Guidelines, supra note 98, at App. A.
107. See White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Baker-Chaput v.
Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976).
108. Baker-Chaput, 406 F. Supp. 1134.
109. Id. at 1140.
110. Manchester's guidelines include, inter alia, the following provisions:
IV. Determination of Eligibility
A. Legal Standard
"Whenever a person in any town shall be poor and unable to support himself
[Vol. 59:443"
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eligibility decisions, and they also require that a welfare official be available
each working day."'
Nevertheless, certain provisions of the Manchester guidelines present subtle
problems. For instance, the guidelines require that a decision on an applica-
he shall be relieved and maintained by the overseers of the public welfare of such
town .... ." [quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 165-1].
1. "whenever" means at whatever time that person is unable to support himself
or herself;
(a) the Welfare Official should be available each working day;
(b) eligibility should be determined at the time of application if an emergency,
or within three working days;
(c) assistance should be granted as soon as eligibility has been determined.
2. "poor and unable to support" means an individual lacks money or material
possessions to adequately provide necessities for himself or family (need [minus]
income and available assets = general assistance).
3. "relieved" means a person shall be assisted to meet these basic needs.
4. "maintained" means to be continued on assistance as long as eligible ...
B. Non-Financial Eligibility Factors ...
4. Eligibility for Categorical Assistance
Applicants who are eligible for other forms of public assistance must apply for
such assistance within one week after being advised to do so by the Welfare Of-
ficial. Failure to do so will render a person ineligible for assistance. Only in ex-
traordinary circumstances will a person receiving another form of public assistance
also be considered as potentially eligible for General Assistance ....
V. Eligibility Standards
A. Expenses: to determine an applicant's standard of need, a budget sheet is
figured, adding actual or allowable expenses, whichever is less, and subtracting
net income. When there is no income, maximum amounts shall be provided as listed.
1. Food
Amounts allowed for food on a weekly basis for zero income:
Family Size Allotment Family Size Allotment
1 $20.00 6 $70.00
2 $30.00 7 $80.00
3 $40.00 8 $90.00
4 $50.00 9 $100.00
5 $60.00 10 $110.00
2. Housing
Arrearages will not be paid. Emergency means a situation not arising from any
action or lack of action by the client. No deposits are assumed by the City of
Manchester.
Rental assistance shall be provided up to the maximum limits set forth by City
Welfare:
Housing Unit All Utilities Basic Rent
1-2 Rooms $50.00 $35.00
3-6 Rooms $65.00 $50.00
3. Utilities
The actual current cost for gas, electricity, oil, etc., shall be used when com-
puting a budget sheet if not included in the rent. The City will not pay arrearages.
C. Length of Eligibility: assistance is authorized on an as-needed basis and is
not continued automatically. The length of assistance varies from a few days to
a week, depending on the need. The applicant is expected to contact this office
each time the circumstances are reviewed to determine further eligibility.
Manchester, New Hampshire, Manchester Welfare Comm'r, General Guidelines for Manchester
City Welfare (March 1, 1982) [hereinafter referred to as Manchester Welfare Guidelines].
111. See Manchester Welfare Guidelines, supra note 110, at IV(A)I(a).
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tion be made within three days of the application, and, in the case of an
emergency, a grant or denial be made at the time of application." I2 The defini-
tion of "emergency," however, is ambiguous: emergency "means a situation
not arising from any action or lack of action by the client. "" 3 Manchester's
guidelines also require that general assistance "be granted" as soon as eligibility
is determined.' While this provision, on its face, appears to be sound, it
is not clear that the wording can be translated to mean that "vouchers shall
be issued and paid" as soon as eligibility is determined. Imposing a deadline
for the issuance of vouchers after a decision has been made would clarify
this uncertainty. Otherwise, one who has shown a legitimate entitlement to
general assistance might suffer hardship merely because of the belated issuance
of a voucher.' 5
Moreover, in determining eligibility for general assistance, Manchester's
guidelines contain a provision that renders an applicant ineligible for general
assistance if he or she fails to apply for categorical assistance within one
week." I6 This provision may be harsh, especially if the person had good cause
for failing to apply. Additionally, there is a clause which excludes categorical
assistance recipients from eligibility for general assistance (except in "extraor-
dinary" circumstances). 7 This clause may contain equal protection problems,
as it is arguably unfair to exclude indigents from eligibility for general assistance
solely because they fall into a category that qualifies them for public assistance,
albeit inadequate."'
Manchester's poor relief eligibility requirements evidence a method for
dispensing general assistance different from procedures used by Indiana" 9 and
South Dakota.'20 First, the Manchester standards use the following formula
for measuring need: expenses (actual or allowable, whichever is less) minus
income and available assets equals need. '2' While this formula is theoretically
sound, it does not specify the period over which expenses minus income will
be measured. Presumably, the formula can be applied to any given period-
perhaps a few weeks or months prior to the time at which the applicant first
applies for assistance. The formula is too manipulatable to fulfill the man-
date of the Baker-Chaput decision: an applicant must be afforded "the op-
112. See id. at IV(A)1(b).
113. See id. at V(A)2 (in the context of housing).
114. See id. at IV(A)I(c).
115. The problem with the tardy issuance of vouchers is also latent in the Indiana and South
Dakota standards. It could be easily cured, however, by way of a provision requiring the timely
issuance of vouchers.
116. See Manchester Welfare Guidelines, supra note 110, at IV(B)4.
117. See id.
118. An attorney for N.H. Legal Assistance, Ronald B. Eskin, has raised this issue (as well
as many other issues) in a letter to the City Solicitor of Manchester. Letter from Ronald B.
Eskin to City Soliciter of Manchester, New Hampshire (March 31, 1982).
119. See North Township Eligibility Standards, supra note 83.
120. See Brookings County Poor Relief Guidelines, supra note 98.
121. See Manchester Welfare Guidelines, supra note 110, at V(C).
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portunity to know beforehand what substantive criteria [must be met] in order
to obtain general assistance.""'2 Furthermore, Manchester has established max-
imum amounts for food and rental assistance when the applicant has had
no income. These "absolute limits" might be challengeable if they in fact
fail to "support and maintain" indigent Manchester citizens.
A final constitutional flaw in the guidelines derives from the provisions
which indicate that general assistance will not be awarded on a continuing
basis; recipients must reapply to determine further eligibility.'23 Because the
statute is silent as to whether general assistance recipients must reapply every
week in order to receive further assistance,' 21 it is arguable that this section
is constitutionally defective for procedural due process reasons. According
to the holding in Brooks v. Center Township,'25 "if the state through its welfare
program extends basic benefits to the needy, it must not take the benefits
away in an arbitrary procedure. If it does so it has violated the constitutional
right of the needy to due process .... ,,,26 Should the applicant for Man-
chester general assistance be deemed eligible, perhaps the city is then required
to "maintain" that individual until he or she becomes ineligible. At the point
of ineligibility, the individual is entitled to receive notice of termination and
a pretermination hearing.' 27
CONCLUSION
Although the political jurisdiction charged with administering general
assistance varies from state to state, it is clear that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires general assistance to be administered
pursuant to written, objective, and ascertainable standards. The written stand-
ards that have emerged from recent litigation form a continuum ranging
from flexible to rigid. All standards examined contain provisions that are am-
biguous and manipulatable. The more flexible standards, however tend to be
more ambiguous, and therefore more likely to be administered in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. These ambiguities, parading under the guise of flex-
ibility, render illusory the due process guarantees the standards are intended
to provide. Consequently, to provide indigents adequate insulation from ar-
bitrary or prejudicial decisionmaking, the ambiguities at both ends of the con-
tinuum must be removed. Only by clarifying such uncertainties will general
assistance guidelines guarantee that the due process rights of the indigent are
being protected.
CYNTHIA J. REICHARD
122. Baker-Chaput, 406 F. Supp. at 1140.
123. See Manchester Welfare Guidelines, supra note 110, at V(C).
124. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 165:1 (Supp. 1983).
125. 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 911 (1974).
126. Id. at 385-86.
127. Id. at 385. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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